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Scenarica's avatar

The vagueness being the point is the right read, and it has a precise market consequence the piece gestures at but doesn't name. A clear rule creates risk. a discretionary one creates uncertainty, and the old Knightian split between the two matters here, because markets can price risk and route around it. Uncertainty they can only flee.

That's why the damage runs past the deals that get blocked. A published rule, even a harsh one, you can underwrite: you discount the probability and structure around the category. An unpublished "public interest" standard with a five-year unwind window can't be underwritten, because there's no distribution to estimate and the risk doesn't end at close. So the effect lands wider than a few blocked deals. It pulls a whole category out of the priceable universe, and the heaviest cost is the deals that never get attempted, the ones that die at the idea stage and never show up as a casualty.

Which reroutes capital in a way the efficiency story misses. Once the veto is discretionary, money stops flowing to the highest return and starts flowing to the most legible rulebook. The destination tracks predictability, not productivity. That's the real price of the sovereignty stack, paid quietly by the projects that never get built where the rules can't be read.

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